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Multiple-Input Multiple-Output Gaussian Broadcast
Channels with Confidential Messages
Ruoheng Liu, Tie Liu, H. Vincent Poor, and Shlomo Shamai (Shitz)
Abstract
This paper considers the problem of secret communication over a two-receiver multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel. The transmitter has two independent messages, each of which is intended for
one of the receivers but needs to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from the other. It is shown that, surprisingly,
under a matrix power constraint both messages can be simultaneously transmitted at their respective maximal secrecy
rates. To prove this result, the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel is revisited and a new characterization of its secrecy
capacity is provided via a new coding scheme that uses artificial noise and random binning.
Index Terms
Artificial noise, broadcast channel, channel enhancement, information-theoretic security, multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) communications, wiretap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid advances in wireless technology are quickly moving us toward a pervasively connected world in which a
vast array of wireless devices, from iPhones to biosensors, seamlessly communicate with one another. The openness
of the wireless medium makes wireless transmission especially susceptible to eavesdropping. Hence, security and
privacy issues have become increasingly critical for wireless networks. Although wireless technologies are becoming
more and more secure, eavesdroppers are also becoming smarter. Sole reliance on cryptographic keys in large
distributed networks where terminals can be compromised is no longer sustainable from the security perspective.
Furthermore, in wireless networks, secure initial key distribution is difficult and, in fact, can be performed in perfect
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Fig. 1. MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages.
secrecy only via physical layer techniques. Therefore, tackling security at the very basic physical layer is of critical
importance.
In this paper, we study the problem of secret communication over the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
Gaussian broadcast channel with two receivers. The transmitter is equipped with t transmit antennas, and receiver
k, k = 1, 2, is equipped with rk receive antennas. A discrete-time sample of the channel can be written as
Yk[m] = HkX[m] + Zk[m], k = 1, 2 (1)
where Hk is the (real) channel matrix of size rk × t, and {Zk[m]}m is an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) additive vector Gaussian noise process with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The channel input
{X[m]}m is subject to the matrix power constraint:
1
n
n∑
m=1
(X[m]X⊺[m])  S (2)
where S is a positive semidefinite matrix, and “” denotes “less than or equal to” in the positive semidefinite
ordering between real symmetric matrices. Note that (2) is a rather general power constraint that subsumes many
other important power constraints including the average total and per-antenna power constraints as special cases.
Consider the communication scenario in which there are two independent messages W1 and W2 at the transmitter.
Message W1 is intended for receiver 1 but needs to be kept secret from receiver 2, and message W2 is intended for
receiver 1 but needs to be kept secret from receiver 2. (See Fig. 1 for an illustration of this communication scenario.)
The confidentiality of the messages at the unintended receivers is measured using the normalized information-
theoretic quantities [1], [2]:
1
n
I(W1;Y
n
2 )→ 0 and
1
n
I(W2;Y
n
1 )→ 0
3whereYnk := (Yk[1], . . . ,Yk[n]), and the limits are taken as the block length n→∞. The goal is to characterize the
entire secrecy rate region Cs(H1,H2,S) = {(R1, R2)} that can be achieved by any coding scheme. Cs(H1,H2,S)
is usually known as the secrecy capacity region of the channel.
In recent years, information-theoretic study of secret MIMO communication has been an active area of research.
(See [3] for a recent survey of progress in this area.) Most noticeably, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel was characterized in [4]–[6] for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) case and [7]–[10] for
the general MIMO case. The secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with a common
and a confidential messages was characterized in [11]. The problem of communicating two confidential messages
over the two-receiver MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel was first considered in [12], where it was shown that
under the average total power constraint, secret dirty-paper coding (S-DPC) based on double binning [13] achieves
the secrecy capacity region for the MISO case. For the general MIMO case, however, characterizing the secrecy
capacity region remained as an open problem.
The main result of this paper is a precise characterization of the secrecy capacity region of the (general) MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel, summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2,S) of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with
confidential messages W1 (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) and W2 (intended
for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the matrix power constraint (2) is given by the
set of nonnegative rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 ≤ max
0BS
(
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 | −
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 |
)
and R2 ≤ max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣) (3)
where Irk denotes the identity matrix of size rk × rk.
Remark 1: Note that the rate region (3) is rectangular. This implies that under the matrix power constraint,
both confidential messages W1 and W2 can be simultaneously transmitted at their respective maximal secrecy rates
(as if over two separate MIMO Gaussian wiretap channels). The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel under the matrix power constraint was characterized in [9], by which the rate region (3) can be rewritten
as the set of nonnegative rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 ≤ max
0BS
(
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 | −
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 |
)
and R2 ≤ max
0BS
(
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 | −
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 |
)
. (4)
4Remark 2: Also note that if B⋆ is an optimal solution to the optimization program:
max
0BS
(log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 | − log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 |) , (5)
then B⋆ simultaneously maximizes both objective functions on the right-hand side (RHS) of (3). On the other hand,
the optimization programs on the RHS of (4) do not, in general, admit the same optimal solution. As we will see,
this makes (3) a better choice when it comes to proving the achievability part of the theorem.
It is rather surprising to see that under the matrix power constraint, both confidential messages W1 and W2
can be simultaneously transmitted at their respective maximal secrecy rates over the MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel (1). As we will see, this is due to the fact that there are in fact two different coding schemes: one uses
only random binning, and the other uses both random binning and artificial noise. Both of them can achieve the
secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. Through S-DPC (double binning) [13], both schemes
can be simultaneously implemented in communicating confidential messages W1 and W2 over the MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel (1).
As a corollary, we have the following characterization of the secrecy capacity region under the average total
power constraint. The result is a simple consequence of [14, Lemma 1].
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2, P ) of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with
confidential messages W1 (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) and W2 (intended
for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the average total power constraint:
1
n
n∑
m=1
‖X[m]‖2 ≤ P (6)
is given by the set of nonnegative rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 ≤
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1B1H
⊺
1 | −
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2B1H
⊺
2 |
and R2 ≤
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣Ir2 +H2(B1 +B2)H⊺2Ir2 +H2B1H⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣Ir1 +H1(B1 +B2)H⊺1Ir1 +H1B1H⊺1
∣∣∣∣ (7)
for some positive semidefinite matrices B1 and B2 such that Tr(B1 +B2) ≤ P .
Remark 3: Unlike Theorem 1, under the average total power constraint, the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO
Gaussian broadcast channel is, in general, not rectangular.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. As mentioned previously, the rectangular nature of
the rate region (3) suggests that the result is intimately connected to the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under the matrix power constraint
was previously characterized in [9], where it was shown that Gaussian random binning without prefix coding is
optimal. In Section II, we revisit the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem and show that Gaussian random
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Fig. 2. MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel.
binning with prefix coding can also achieve the secrecy capacity, provided that the prefix channel is appropriately
chosen. In Section III, we prove Theorem 1 using two different characterizations of the secrecy capacity of the
MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel and S-DPC (double binning) [13]. Numerical examples are provided in Section IV
to illustrate the theoretical results. Finally, in Section V, we conclude the paper with some remarks.
II. MIMO GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL REVISITED
In this section, we revisit the problem of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under a matrix power constraint.
The problem was first considered in [9], where a precise characterization of the secrecy capacity was provided.
The goal of this section is to provide an alternative characterization of the secrecy capacity which will facilitate
proving Theorem 1. More specifically, we wish to provide a MIMO wiretap channel bound on the secrecy rate R2
which will match the RHS of (3).
For that purpose, consider again the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) but this time with only one confidential
message W at the transmitter. Message W is intended for receiver 2 (the legitimate receiver) but needs to be kept
secret from receiver 1 (the eavesdropper). The confidentiality of W at receiver 1 is measured using the normalized
information-theoretic quantity [1], [2]:
1
n
I(W ;Yn1 )→ 0.
The channel input {X[m]}m is subject to the matrix power constraint (2). The goal is to characterize the secrecy
capacity Cs(H2,H1,S)1, which is the maximum achievable secrecy rate for message W . This communication
scenario, as illustrated in Fig. 2, is widely known as the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel [4]–[9].
1In our notation, the first argument in Cs(·) represents the channel matrix for the legitimate receiver, and the second argument represents
the channel matrix for the eavesdropper.
6In their seminal work [2], Csisza´r and Ko¨rner provided a single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity:
Cs(H2,H1,S) = max
(U,X)
[I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Y1)] (8)
where U is an auxiliary variable, and the maximization is over all jointly distributed (U,X) such that U → X→
(Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain and E[XX⊺]  S. Here, I(U,Yk) denotes the mutual information between U
and Yk. As shown in [2], the secrecy rate on the RHS of (8) can be achieved by a coding scheme that combines
random binning and prefix coding [2]. More specifically, the auxiliary variable U represents a precoding signal,
and the conditional distribution of X given U represents the prefix channel. In [9], Liu and Shamai further studied
the optimization problem on the RHS of (8) and showed that a Gaussian U = X is an optimal solution. Hence, a
matrix characterization of the secrecy capacity is given by [9]
Cs(H2,H1,S) = max
0BS
(
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 | −
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 |
)
. (9)
We may conclude that Gaussian random binning without prefix coding is an optimal coding strategy for the MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel.
Next, we show that a different coding scheme that combines Gaussian random binning and prefix coding can
also achieve the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. This leads to a new characterization of
the secrecy capacity, summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity Cs(H2,H1,S) of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with a confidential
message W (intended for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the matrix power constraint
(2) is given by:
Cs(H2,H1,S) = max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣) . (10)
Remark 4: The achievability of the secrecy rate on the RHS of (10) can be obtained from the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
expression (8) by choosing X = U + V , where U and V are two independent Gaussian vectors with zero means
and covariance matrices S−B and B, respectively. This choice of (U,X) differs from that for (9) in two important
ways:
1) In (10), the input vector X always has a full covariance matrix S. For (9), the covariance matrix of X needs
to be chosen to solve an optimization program; the full covariance matrix S is not always an optimal solution.
2) In (10), the conditional distribution of X given U may form a nontrivial prefix channel. For (9), U ≡ X so
prefix coding is never applied.
Remark 5: Note that the prefix channel in (10) is an additive vector Gaussian noise channel, so the auxiliary
variable V represents an artificial noise [15] sent (on purpose) by the transmitter to confuse the eavesdropper.
7Since the artificial noise has no structure to it, it will add to the noise floor at both legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper.
The converse part of the theorem can be proved using a channel-enhancement argument, similar to that in [9].
The details of the proof are provided in Appendix I.
III. MIMO GAUSSIAN BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. To prove the converse part of the theorem, we will consider a single-
message, wiretap channel bound on the secrecy rates R1 and R2. More specifically, note that both messages W1
and W2 can be transmitted at the maximum secrecy rate when the other message is absent from the transmission.
Therefore, to bound from above the secrecy rate R1, we assume that only W1 needs to be communicated over the
channel. This is precisely a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem with receiver 1 as legitimate receiver and
receiver 2 as eavesdropper. Reversing the roles of receiver 1 and 2, we have from (9) that
R1 ≤ Cs(H1,H2,S)
= max
0BS
(
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 | −
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 |
)
. (11)
Similarly, to bound from above the secrecy rate R2, let us assume that only W2 needs to be communicated over the
channel. This is, again, a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem with receiver 2 playing the role of legitimate
receiver and receiver 1 playing the role of eavesdropper. By Theorem 2,
R2 ≤ Cs(H2,H1,S)
= max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣) . (12)
Putting together (11) and (12), we have proved the converse part of the theorem.
Next, we show that every rate pair (R1, R2) within the secrecy rate region (3) is achievable. Note that (3) is
rectangular, so we only need to show that the corner point (R1, R2) given by
R1 = max
0BS
(
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 | −
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 |
)
and R2 = max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣) (13)
is achievable.
Recall from [13] that for any jointly distributed (V1, V2,X) such that (V1, V2)→ X→ (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov
8chain and E[XX⊺]  S, the secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) given by
R1 = I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;V2,Y2)
and R2 = I(V2;Y2)− I(V2;V1,Y1) (14)
is achievable for the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) under the matrix power constraint (2). In [13], the
achievability of the rate pair (14) was proved using a double-binning scheme. Specifically, the auxiliary variables
V1 and V2 represent the precoding signals for the confidential messages W1 and W2, respectively.
Now let B be a positive semidefinite matrix such that B  S, and let
V1 = U1 + FU2
V2 = U2
and X = U1 +U2 (15)
where U1 and U2 are two independent Gaussian vectors with zero means and covariance matrices B and S−B,
respectively, and
F := BH⊺1(Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1)
−1H1. (16)
By (15),
Yk = Hk(U1 +U2) + Zk
for k = 1, 2. Note that the matrix F defined in (16) is precisely the precoding matrix for suppressing U2 from Y1
[16, Theorem 1]. Hence,
I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;V2) = I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;U2)
=
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 | . (17)
Moreover,
I(V1;Y2|V2) = I(U1 + FU2;H2(U1 +U2) + Z2|U2)
= I(U1;H2U1 + Z2|U2)
= I(U1;H2U1 + Z2)
=
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 | (18)
where the third equality follows from the fact that U1 and U2 are independent. Putting together (17) and (18), we
9have
I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;V2,Y2) = [I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;V2)]− I(V1;Y2|V2)
=
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1BH
⊺
1 | −
1
2
log |Ir2 +H2BH
⊺
2 | . (19)
Similarly,
I(V1, V2;Y1) = I(U1 + FU2,U2;H1(U1 +U2) + Z2)
= I(U1,U2;H1(U1 +U2) + Z2)
=
1
2
log |Ir1 +H1SH
⊺
1 | . (20)
Thus,
I(V2;V1,Y1) = I(V2;Y1|V1) + I(V2;V1)
= I(V1, V2;Y1)− [I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;V2)]
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣ (21)
where the last equality follows from (17) and (20). Moreover,
I(V2;Y2) = I(U2;H2(U1 +U2) + Z2)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣ . (22)
Putting together (21) and (22), we have
I(V2;Y2)− I(V2;V1,Y1) =
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣ . (23)
Finally, let B be an optimal solution to the optimization program (5). As mentioned previously in Remark 2, such
a choice will simultaneously maximize the RHS of (19) and (23). Thus, the corner point (13) is indeed achievable.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 6: Note that in standard dirty-paper coding (DPC), the precoding matrix F is chosen to cancel the known
interference. In our scheme, such a choice plays two important roles. First, it helps to cancel the precoding signal
representing message W2, so message W1 sees an interference-free legitimate receiver channel. Second, it helps to
boost the security for message W2 by causing interference to its eavesdropper. For this reason, we call our scheme
S-DPC, to differentiate from the standard DPC.
Remark 7: In S-DPC, both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper for message W1 are interference free.
On the other hand, for message W2, both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are subject to interference
10
from the precoding signal representing message W1. As we have seen in Section II, the secrecy capacity of the
MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel can be achieved with or without interference in place. Therefore, both secrecy
capacity achieving schemes can be simultaneously implemented via S-DPC to simultaneously communicate both
confidential messages at their respective maximal secrecy rates.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel with confidential messages. As shown in (3) and (7), under both matrix and average total power
constraints, the secrecy capacity regions Cs(H1,H2,S) and Cs(H1,H2, P ) are expressed in terms of matrix
optimization programs (though implicit in (7)). In general, these optimization programs are not convex, and hence,
finding the boundary of the secrecy capacity regions is nontrivial.
In [12], a precise characterization of the secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2, P ) was obtained for the MISO
Gaussian broadcast channel using the generalized eigenvalue decomposition [17, Ch. 6.3]. For the aligned MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel, [10] provided an explicit, closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity. In the
following, we generalize the results of [10] and [12] to the general MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel under
the matrix power constraint.
Let φj , j = 1, . . . , t, be the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil(
It + S
1
2H
⊺
1H1S
1
2 , It + S
1
2H
⊺
2H2S
1
2
)
. (24)
Since both It + S
1
2H
⊺
1H1S
1
2 and It + S
1
2H
⊺
2H2S
1
2 are strictly positive definite, we have φj > 0 for j = 1, . . . , t.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that these generalized eigenvalues are ordered as
φ1 ≥ · · · ≥ φρ > 1 ≥ φρ+1 ≥ · · · ≥ φt > 0,
i.e., a total of ρ of them are assumed to be greater than 1. We have the following characterization of the secrecy
capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under the matrix power constraint, which is a natural extension
of [10].
Theorem 3: The secrecy capacity Cs(H1,H2,S) of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with confidential
message W (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) under the matrix power constraint
(2) is given by
Cs(H1,H2,S) =
1
2
ρ∑
j=1
log φj (25)
where φj , j = 1, . . . , ρ, are the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (24) that are greater than 1.
11
Remark 8: Note that It+S
1
2H
⊺
2H2S
1
2 is invertible, so computing the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (24)
can be reduced to the problem of finding standard eigenvalues of a related semidefinite matrix [17, Ch. 6.3]. Hence,
the secrecy capacity expression (25) is computable.
A proof of the theorem following the approach of [10] is provided in Appendix II. As a corollary, we have the
following characterization of the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential
messages under the matrix power constraint.
Corollary 2: The secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2,S) of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with
confidential messages W1 (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) and W2 (intended
for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the matrix constraint (2) is given by the set of
nonnegative rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 ≤
1
2
ρ∑
j=1
log φj
and R2 ≤
1
2
t∑
j=ρ+1
log
1
φj
(26)
where φj , j = 1, . . . , ρ, are the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (24) that are greater than 1, and φj , j =
ρ+ 1, . . . , t, are the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (24) that are less than or equal to 1.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we only need to show that the secrecy capacity
Cs(H2,H1,S) =
1
2
t∑
j=ρ+1
log
1
φj
.
Consider the pencil
(
It + S
1
2H
⊺
2H2S
1
2 , It + S
1
2H
⊺
1H1S
1
2
)
. (27)
Note that the pencils (24) and (27) are generated by the same pair of semidefinite matrices but with different order.
Therefore, the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (27) are given by
0 <
1
φ1
≤ · · · ≤
1
φρ
< 1 ≤
1
φρ+1
≤ · · · ≤
1
φt
.
Applying Theorem 3 for Cs(H2,H1,S) completes the proof of the corollary.
Under the average total power constraint, we have not been able to find a computable secrecy capacity expression
for the general MIMO case. We can, however, write [14, Lemma 1]
Cs(H1,H2, P ) =
⋃
S0, Tr(S)≤P
Cs(H1,H2,S).
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate regions of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel under the average total power constraint.
For any given semidefinite S, Cs(H1,H2,S) can be computed as given by (26). Then, the secrecy capacity region
Cs(H1,H2, P ) can be found through an exhaustive search over the set {S : S  0 and Tr(S) ≤ P}.
Let h11 = (0.3 2.5), h12 = (2.2 1.8), h21 = (1.3 1.2), h22 = (1.5 3.9) and P = 12, and let
Hk =
 hk1
hk2
 , k = 1, 2.
The secrecy capacity regions Cs(h11,h22, P ), Cs(H1,h22, P ), Cs(h11,H2, P ) and Cs(H1,H2, P ) are illustrated
in Fig. 3. For comparison, we have also plotted the secrecy rate regions achieved by the simple zero-forcing
(ZF) strategy. In ZF, each of the confidential messages is encoded using a vector Gaussian signal. To guarantee
confidentiality, the covariance matrices of the transmit signals are chosen in the null space of the channel matrix
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Fig. 4. Rate regions of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel under the power matrix constraint.
at the unintended receiver. Hence, the achievable secrecy rate region is given by
RZFS (H1,H2, P ) =
⋃
B10, B20, Tr(B1+B2)≤P
H2B1=0, H1B2=0
(R1, R2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ R1 ≤
1
2 log |Ir1 +H1B1H
⊺
1 |
R2 ≤
1
2 log |Ir2 +H2B2H
⊺
2 |
 . (28)
Note that unlike the secrecy capacity region expression (7), computing the rate region (28) only involves solving
convex optimization programs. As shown in Fig. 3, in all four scenarios, ZF is strictly suboptimal as compared
with S-DPC. In particular, if the channel matrix of the unintended receiver has full row rank, ZF cannot achieve
any positive secrecy rate for the corresponding confidential message. On the other hand, S-DPC can always achieve
positive secrecy rates for both confidential messages unless the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel is degraded.
Finally, let
H1 =
1.8 −2.0 2.0
1.0 −6.0 3.0

H2 =
2.3 2.0 −3
2.0 1.2 −1.5

and
S =

5.0 −0.7 −2.0
−0.7 3.8 −2.5
−2.0 −2.5 5.0
 .
Fig. 4 illustrates the secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2,S) of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) under
the matrix power constraint (2). Here, the secrecy capacity region Cs(H1,H2,S) is plotted based on the com-
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putable expression (26). Also in the figure are the secrecy rate region RZFs (H1,H2,S) achieved by ZF strategy
and the nonsecrecy capacity region RDPC(H1,H2,S) achieved by standard DPC [14]. As expected, we have
RZFs (H1,H2,S) ⊂ Cs(H1,H2,S) ⊂ R
DPC(H1,H2,S).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have considered the problem of communicating two confidential messages over the two-receiver
MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel. Each of the confidential messages is intended for one of the receivers but needs
to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from the other. Precise characterizations of the secrecy capacity region
have been provided under both matrix and average total power constraints. Surprisingly, under the matrix power
constraint, both confidential messages can be transmitted simultaneously at their respective maximal secrecy rates.
To prove this result, we have revisited the problem of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel and proposed a new
coding scheme that achieves the secrecy capacity of the channel. Unlike the previous scheme considered in [4]–[9]
where prefix coding is not applied, the new coding scheme uses artificial vector Gaussian noise as a way of prefix
coding. Moreover, the optimal covariance matrix of the artificial noise coincides with that of the transmit signal
in the previous scheme. This allows both schemes to be overlayed via S-DPC without sacrificing the secrecy rate
performance for either of them. We believe that the new understanding of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel
problem gained in this work will help to solve some other multiuser secret communication problems.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 2. As mentioned previously in Remark 4, the secrecy rate on the RHS of
(10) can be achieved by a coding scheme that combines Gaussian random binning and prefix coding. We therefore
concentrate on the converse part of the theorem.
Following [9], we will first prove the converse result for the special case where the channel matrices H1 and H2
are square and invertible. Next, we will broaden the result to the general case by approximating arbitrary channel
matrices H1 and H2 by square and invertible ones. For brevity, we will term the special case as the aligned MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel and the general case as the general MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel.
A. Aligned MIMO Gaussian Wiretap Channel
Consider the special case of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) where the channel matrices H1 and H2
are square and invertible. Multiplying both sides of (1) by H−1k , the channel model can be equivalently written as
Yk[m] = X[m] + Zk[m], k = 1, 2 (29)
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where {Zk[m]}m is an i.i.d. additive vector Gaussian noise process with zero mean and covariance matrix
Nk = H
−1
k H
−⊺
k . (30)
Denote by Cs(N2,N1,S) the secrecy capacity of (29) (viewed as a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with receiver 2
as legitimate receiver and receiver 1 as eavesdropper) under the matrix power constraint (2). We have the following
characterization of Cs(N2,N1,S).
Lemma 1: The secrecy capacity
Cs(N2,N1,S) = max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+N2B+N2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ S+N1B+N1
∣∣∣∣) . (31)
Proof: The achievability of the secrecy rate on the RHS of (31) follows from the achievability of the secrecy
rate on the RHS of (10) for the general case and the definition of Nk in (30). To prove the converse result, we
will follow [9] and consider a channel-enhancement argument as follows.
Let us first assume that S ≻ 0. In this case, let B⋆ be an optimal solution to the optimization program on the
RHS of (31). Then, B⋆ must satisfy the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions [9]:
(B⋆ +N1)
−1 +M1 = (B
⋆ +N2)
−1 +M2 (32a)
B⋆M1 = 0 (32b)
and (S−B⋆)M2 = 0 (32c)
where M1 and M2 are positive semidefinite matrices. Let N˜1 be a real symmetric matrix such that
(B⋆ + N˜1)
−1 = (B⋆ +N1)
−1 +M1. (33)
From Eqns. (23), (25), (31) and (34) of [9], we have
0 ≺ N˜1  {N1,N2}, (34)
∣∣∣∣∣B⋆ + N˜1N˜1
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣B⋆ +N1N1
∣∣∣∣ (35)
and ∣∣∣∣∣ S+ N˜1B⋆ + N˜1
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ S+N2B⋆ +N2
∣∣∣∣ . (36)
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Now consider an enhanced MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel:
Y1[m] = X[m] + Z1[m]
and Y2[m] = X[m] + Z˜1[m] (37)
where {Z1[m]}m and {Z˜1[m]}m are i.i.d. additive vector Gaussian noise processes with zero means and covariance
matrices N1 and N˜1, respectively. Denote by Cs(N˜1,N1,S) the secrecy capacity of (37) (viewed as a MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel with receiver 2 as legitimate receiver and receiver 1 as eavesdropper) under the matrix
constraint (2). Note from (34) that N˜1  N1, so the enhanced MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel (37) is degraded.
Hence,
Cs(N˜1,N1,S) =
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣S+ N˜1N˜1
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣S+N1N1
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
log
(∣∣∣∣∣S+ N˜1S+N1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣N1
N˜1
∣∣∣∣
)
=
1
2
log
(∣∣∣∣∣S+ N˜1S+N1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣B⋆ +N1
B⋆ + N˜1
∣∣∣∣
)
=
1
2
log
(∣∣∣∣∣ S+ N˜1B⋆ + N˜1
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣B⋆ +N1S+N1
∣∣∣∣
)
=
1
2
log
(∣∣∣∣ S+N2B⋆ +N2
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣∣B⋆ +N1S+N1
∣∣∣∣)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+N2B⋆ +N2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ S+N1B⋆ +N1
∣∣∣∣ (38)
where the first equality follows from [9, Theorem 1]; the third equality follows from (35); and the fifth equality
follows from (36).
Finally, note from (34) that N˜1  N2, i.e., the legitimate receiver in the enhanced wiretap channel (37) receives
a better signal that the legitimate receiver in the original wiretap channel (29). Therefore,
Cs(N2,N1,S) ≤ Cs(N˜1,N1,S)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ S+N2B⋆ +N2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ S+N1B⋆ +N1
∣∣∣∣
where the last equality follows from (38). This proved the desired converse result for S ≻ 0.
For the case when S  0, |S| = 0, let
θ = Rank(S) < t.
Following the same footsteps as in the proof of [14, Lemma 2], we can define an equivalent aligned MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel with θ transmit and receive antennas and a new covariance matrix power constraint that is strictly
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positive definite. Hence, we can convert the case when S  0, |S| = 0 to the case when S ≻ 0 with the same
secrecy capacity. This argument can be formally described as follows.
Since S is positive semidefinite, we can write
S = QSΛSQ
⊺
S
where QS is an orthogonal matrix and
ΛS = Diag(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−θ
, s1, . . . , sθ)
is diagonal with sj > 0, j = 1, . . . , θ. For k = 1, 2, write
Q
⊺
S
NkQS =
Ck Dk
D
⊺
k Ek

where Ck, Dk and Ek are (sub)matrices of size (t− θ)× (t− θ), (t− θ)× θ and θ × θ, respectively. Let
Ak :=
 It−θ 0(t−θ)×θ
−D⊺kC
−1
k Iθ
 , k = 1, 2.
We now define an intermediate and equivalent channel by multiplying both sides of (29) by an invertible matrix
AkQ
⊺
S
:
Y′k[m] = X
′[m] + Z′k[m], k = 1, 2 (39)
where
Y′k[m] = AkQ
⊺
S
Yk[m]
X′[m] = AkQ
⊺
S
X[m]
and Z′k[m] = AkQ
⊺
S
Zk[m].
Then, the covariance matrix N′k of the additive Gaussian noise vector Z′k[m] is given by
N′k =
Ck 0
0 Ek −D
⊺
kC
−1
k Dk
 . (40)
and the matrix power constraint (2) becomes
1
n
n∑
m=1
X′[m]X′
⊺
[m]  S′ (41)
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where
S′ = AkQ
⊺
S
SQSA
⊺
k
= AkΛSA
⊺
k
= ΛS. (42)
Note from (42) that S′ is diagonal with first t− θ diagonal elements equal to zero. Thus, the matrix constraint
(41) requires that the first t − θ elements of X′[m] be zero. Moreover, from (40), the first t − θ and the rest of
θ elements of Z′k[m] are uncorrelated and hence must be independent as Z′k[m] is Gaussian. Therefore, only the
latter θ antennas transmit/receive information regarding message W . This allows us to define another equivalent
aligned MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with θ antennas at the transmitter and each of the receivers:
Yk[m] = X[m] + Zk[m], k = 1, 2 (43)
where
Yk[m] = AY
′
k[m]
X[m] = AX′[m]
Zk[m] = AZ
′
k[m]
and A =
[
0θ×(t−θ) Iθ
]
. Now, the matrix power constraint (41) becomes
1
n
n∑
m=1
X[m]X
⊺
[m]  S (44)
where
S = AS′A
⊺
= Diag(s1, . . . , sθ). (45)
Note that the matrix power constraint S is strictly positive definite, so we can apply the previous result to the new
wiretap channel (43). This completes the proof of the lemma.
B. General MIMO Gaussian Wiretap Channel
For the general case, we may assume that the channel matricesH1 andH2 are square but not necessarily invertible.
If that is not the case, we can use singular value decomposition (SVD) to show that there is an equivalent channel
which does have t× t square channel matrices. That is, we can find a new channel with square channel matrices
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which are derived from the original ones via matrix multiplications. The new channel is equivalent to the original
one in preserving the secrecy capacity under the same power constraint.
Consider using SVD to write the channel matrices as follows:
Hk = UkΛkV
⊺
k , k = 1, 2
where Uk and Vk are t × t orthogonal matrices, and Λk is diagonal. We now define a new MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel which has invertible channel matrices:
Yk[m] = HkX[m] + Zk[m], k = 1, 2 (46)
where
Hk = Uk(Λk + αIt)V
t
k
for some α > 0, and {Zk[m]}m is an i.i.d. additive vector Gaussian noise process with zero mean and identity
covariance matrix. Note that the channel matrices Hk, k = 1, 2, are invertible. By Lemma 1, the secrecy capacity
Cs(H2,H1,S) of (29) (viewed as a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with receiver 2 as legitimate receiver and
receiver 1 as eavesdropper) under the matrix power constraint (2) is given by
Cs(H2,H1,S) = max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ It +H2SH⊺2It +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ It +H1SH⊺1It +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣) .
Finally, let α ↓ 0. We have Hk → Hk, k = 1, 2 and hence
Cs(H2,H1,S)→ max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣) .
Moreover, by Eqns. (45) and (46) of [9],
Cs(H2,H1,S) ≤ Cs(H2,H1,S) +O(α) (47)
where O(α)→ 0 in the limit as α ↓ 0. Thus, we have the desired converse result
Cs(H2,H1,S) ≤ max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ Ir2 +H2SH⊺2Ir2 +H2BH⊺2
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ Ir1 +H1SH⊺1Ir1 +H1BH⊺1
∣∣∣∣)
by letting α ↓ 0 on the RHS of (47). This completes the proof of the theorem.
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APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the matrix power constraint
S is strictly positive definite and the channel matrices H1 and H2 are square but not necessarily invertible. We
start with the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2: For any t× t matrices B and H such that B  0, we have
|It +HBH
⊺| = |It +H
⊺HB| . (48)
In particular, if B = It, we have
|It +HH
⊺| = |It +H
⊺H| . (49)
Proof: Note that if H is invertible, the equalities in (48) and (49) are trivial. Otherwise, consider using SVD
to rewrite H as
H = UΛV⊺
where U and V are t× t orthogonal matrices, and
Λ = Diag(0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−b
, λ1, . . . , λb)
is diagonal with λj > 0, j = 1, . . . , b. Write
V⊺BV =
CB DB
D
⊺
B
EB

where CB, DB and EB are (sub)matrices of size (t− b)× (t− b), (t− b)× b and b× b, respectively. Then,
|It +HBH
⊺| = |It +UΛV
⊺BVΛU⊺|
= |It +ΛV
⊺BVΛ|
=
∣∣Ib +ΛEBΛ∣∣ (50)
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where Λ = Diag(λ1, . . . , λb). On the other hand,
|It +H
⊺HB| =
∣∣It +VΛ2V⊺B∣∣
=
∣∣It +Λ2V⊺BV∣∣
=
∣∣∣Ib +Λ2EB∣∣∣
=
∣∣Ib +ΛEBΛ∣∣ (51)
where the last equality follows from the fact that Λ is invertible. Putting together (50) and (51) proves the equality
in (48). This completes the proof of the lemma.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3, following the approach of [10]. Let
Ok := H
⊺
kHk k = 1, 2, (52)
and let Φ denote the generalized eigenvalue matrix of the pencil
(
It + S
1
2O1S
1
2 , It + S
1
2O2S
1
2
)
such that
Φ =
Φ1 0
0 Φ2

where Φ1 = Diag{φ1, . . . , φρ} and Φ2 = Diag{φρ+1, . . . , φt}. Let G be the corresponding generalized eigenvector
matrix such that
G⊺
(
It + S
1
2O1S
1
2
)
G = Φ
and G⊺
(
It + S
1
2O2S
1
2
)
G = It. (53)
Now define
O˜ := S−
1
2
G−⊺
Φ1 0
0 It−ρ
G−1 − It
S− 12 . (54)
Since the generalized eigenvalues are ordered as
φ1 ≥ · · · ≥ φρ > 1 ≥ φρ+1 ≥ · · · ≥ φt > 0,
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we have Φ1 0
0 It−ρ
  Φ
and
Φ1 0
0 It−ρ
  It.
Hence by (53) and (54),
O˜  {O1,O2}. (55)
It follows that
Cs(H1,H2,S) = max
0BS
(
1
2
log |It +H1BH
⊺
1 | −
1
2
log |It +H2BH
⊺
2 |
)
= max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B 12H⊺1H1B 12 ∣∣∣− 12 log ∣∣∣It +B 12H⊺2H2B 12 ∣∣∣
)
(56)
= max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B 12O1B 12 ∣∣∣− 1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B 12O2B 12 ∣∣∣) (57)
≤ max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B 12 O˜B 12 ∣∣∣− 1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B 12O2B 12 ∣∣∣) (58)
= max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣It + O˜ 12BO˜ 12 ∣∣∣− 1
2
log
∣∣∣It +O 122BO 122 ∣∣∣) (59)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣It + O˜ 12SO˜ 12 ∣∣∣− 1
2
log
∣∣∣It +O 122SO 122 ∣∣∣ (60)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣It + S 12 O˜S 12 ∣∣∣− 1
2
log
∣∣∣It + S 12O2S 12 ∣∣∣ (61)
=
1
2
log
∣∣Φ1∣∣ (62)
=
1
2
ρ∑
j=1
log φj (63)
where (56), (59) and (61) follow from (49); (57) follows from the definition of O1 in (52); (58) follows from the
fact that O1  O˜ (see (55)); (60) follows from the fact that O2  O˜ (see (55)); and (62) follows (53) and the
definition of O˜ in (54).
To prove the reverse inequality, let G = [G1G2] where G1 and G2 are (sub)matrices of size t× ρ and t× ρ,
respectively, and let
B⋆ := S
1
2G
(G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
G⊺S 12 . (64)
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Then, B⋆ is positive semidefinite. Moreover, we may verify that B⋆  S as follows. Note that G is invertible, so
it is enough to show that (G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
  (G⊺G)−1 .
Note that
G⊺G =
G⊺1G1 G⊺1G2
G
⊺
2G1 G
⊺
2G2
 .
Using block inversion, we may obtain
(G⊺G)−1 =
(G⊺1G1)−1 + (G⊺1G1)−1G⊺1G2E−1G G⊺2G1(G⊺1G1)−1 (G⊺1G1)−1G⊺1G2E−1G
E−1
G
G
⊺
2G1(G
⊺
1G1)
−1 E−1
G

where
EG = G
⊺
2G2 −G
⊺
2G1(G
⊺
1G1)
−1G
⊺
1G2.
Since G⊺G is positive definite, we have
EG ≻ 0
and hence
(G⊺G)−1 −
(G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
 =
(G⊺1G1)−1G⊺1G2E−1G G⊺2G1(G⊺1G1)−1 (G⊺1G1)−1G⊺1G2E−1G
E−1
G
G
⊺
2G1(G
⊺
1G1)
−1 E−1
G

=
Iρ (G⊺1G1)−1G⊺1G2
0 It−ρ
0 0
0 E−1
G
 Iρ 0
G
⊺
2G1(G
⊺
1G1)
−1 It−ρ

 0.
By (57),
Cs(H1,H2,S) = max
0BS
(
1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B 12O1B 12 ∣∣∣− 1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B 12O2B 12 ∣∣∣)
≥
1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B⋆ 12O1B⋆ 12 ∣∣∣− 1
2
log
∣∣∣It +B⋆ 12O2B⋆ 12 ∣∣∣
=
1
2
log |It +B
⋆O1| −
1
2
log |It +B
⋆O2| (65)
24
where the last equality follows from (48). From (53), we have
O1 = S
− 1
2
(
G−⊺ΦG−1 − It
)
S−
1
2
and O2 = S−
1
2
(
G−⊺G−1 − It
)
S−
1
2 . (66)
Hence,
B⋆O1 = S
1
2G
(G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
G⊺ (G−⊺ΦG−1 − It)S− 12
= S
1
2G
(G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
Φ−
(G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
G⊺G
G−1S− 12
= S
1
2G
(G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
Φ1 0
0 Φ2
−
(G⊺1G1)−1 0
0 0
G⊺1G1 G⊺1G2
G
⊺
2G1 G
⊺
2G2
G−1S− 12
= S
1
2G
(G⊺1G1)−1Φ1 − Iρ − (G⊺1G1)−1G⊺1G2
0 0
G−1S− 12
giving
|It +B
⋆O1| = |G
⊺
1G1|
−1 ∣∣Φ1∣∣ . (67)
Similarly, we may obtain
B⋆O2 = S
1
2G
(G⊺1G1)−1 − Iρ − (G⊺1G1)−1G⊺1G2
0 0
G−1S− 12
and
|It +B
⋆O2| = |G
⊺
1G1|
−1
. (68)
Substituting (67) and (68) into (65), we may obtain
Cs(H1,H2,S) ≥
1
2
log
∣∣Φ1∣∣
=
1
2
ρ∑
j=1
log φj . (69)
Putting together (63) and (69) establishes the desired equality
Cs(H1,H2,S) =
1
2
ρ∑
j=1
log φj .
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This completes the proof of the theorem.
REFERENCES
[1] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[2] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May
1978.
[3] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz), Information Theoretic Security. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Now Publishers, 2009.
[4] Z. Li, W. Trappe, and R. D. Yates, “Secret communication via multi-antenna transmission,” in Proc. Forty-First Annual Conference on
Information Sciences and Systems, Baltimore, MD, Mar. 2007.
[5] A. Khisti and G. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas: The MISOME wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
submitted for publication.
[6] S. Shafiee, N. Liu, and S. Ulukus, “Towards the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO wire-tap channel: The 2-2-1 channel,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, to appear.
[7] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel,” in Proc. 45th Annual Allerton Conf. Comm.,
Contr., Computing, Monticello, IL, Sep. 2007.
[8] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Information Theory, Toronto,
Canada, July 2008, pp. 524–528.
[9] T. Liu and S. Shamai (Shitz), “A note on the secrecy capacity of the multiantenna wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, to appear.
[10] R. Bustin, R. Liu, H. V. Poor, and S. Shamai (Shitz), “A MMSE approach to the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking (Special Isssue on Wireless Physical Layer Security),
submitted November 2008.
[11] H. D. Ly, T. Liu, and Y. Liang, “MIMO broadcasting with common, private and confidential messages,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Inform.
Theory Applications, Auckland, New Zealand, Dec. 2008.
[12] R. Liu and H. V. Poor, “Secrecy capacity region of a multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 1235–1249, Mar. 2009.
[13] R. Liu, I. Maric, P. Spasojevic, and R. D. Yates, “Discrete memoryless interference and broadcast channels with confidential messages:
Secrecy rate regions,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2493–2507, Jun. 2008.
[14] H. Weingarten, Y. Steinberg, and S. Shamai (Shitz), “The capacity region of the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output broadcast
channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 52, pp. 3936–3964, Sep. 2006.
[15] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Comm., vol. 7, pp. 2180–2189, Jun. 2008.
[16] W. Yu and J. M. Cioffi, “Sum capacity of Gaussian vector broadcast channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 50, pp. 1875–1892, Sep.
2004.
[17] G. Strang, Linear Algebra and Its Applications. Wellesley, MA: Wellesley-Cambridge Press, 1998.
